NIE Updates

Lots of new information and analysis out there about the recent National Intelligence Estimate saying Iran stopped its nuclear program in 2003. Here is some of the latest:

Historical Precedent
Brett McCrea raises some questions about the recent NIE based on historical precedent. Basically, the statements used in regard to Iran are eerily similar to reports from the late '60s and '70s before India went nuclear. The premise then was that it was not in India's best interest (according to a 'cost-benefit analysis') to go nuclear. They did it anyway because of political pressures from China. The question now is: will Iran find political pressures (i.e. the U.S. presence nearby, a nuclear Israel, the existence of Israel) great enough to ignore the same 'cost-benefit analysis'? It's something we need to understand.

Increased Risk of Nuclear War
James Lewis encourages us to look at the evidence in light of this argument: "If the controversial new National Intelligence Estimate claiming that Iran has given up on building nukes is true, we should all give a big cheer and go back to sleep. If it is not true, it would increase the danger of a nuclear war in the Middle East. So this is not just a wrangle among intelligence careerists with political agendas; it is a matter of life or death."

He gives a great example of why this is the case:

Let's go back to the cop-and-shooter example. Yesterday, a man killed 8 innocents and himself at a shopping mall in Omaha, Nebraska. Suppose an armed and trained police officer had been on the spot in the mall. That is exactly the situation the West, and especially the United States, faces with Iranian nukes right at the oil spigot in the Middle East. Like it or not, we're the cop on the beat, because nobody else has either the military power or the sense of responsibility to protect the oil centers for much of the industrialized world.

The shooter in Nebraska apparently hid his gun under his shirt as he walked into the mall. So the cop on the beat has a choice: Does the suspect have a gun or not? Police officers encounter this situation every time they stop a suspicious car. Generally speaking, we place the burden of proof that there is no gun on the suspect: He has to come out of the car with his hands in plain sight. The Iranians have consistently refused to do that, and they still do.

Instead, the burden of proving that our loudmouthed suspect is unarmed has now been placed on the cop. If the cop assumes, like the NIE does, that the perp has no gun, he is automatically risking his own life, and the lives of innocents. An NIE judgment of "innocent" can therefore increase the danger of Iranian nukes if it is wrong.

Here's why it matters:

"Remember again, that once the Iranians have a nuclear weapon, they become close to invulnerable. We've seen it with the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang -- nobody can touch it, no matter how many of its own people it starves to death, and no matter how much it threatens its neighbors, because it is likely to have a nuke. To prevent nuclearization of the Middle East, the only possible military action is preemptive, before nukes ever get involved.

The liberal press has been cheering this NIE, not because it is truthful (we just don't know), but become it confirms their preexisting biases. That is bizarre and thoughtless. There is one, and only one question: Is it true?"

Israel Makes Its Case
In a rare move, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, will visit Israel, where the Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff will present their hard evidence of Iran's nuclear program. Israel is still convinced -- as are many in the U.S. -- that Iran did not give up their nuclear program, and that politics are in play that have muddied these waters.


John Bolton Debunks the NIE
Fox's Hannity & Colmes hosted Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton last night, and he debunked the reporting on the recent NIE. See the link for the whole exchange, but the short version is that just because a new puzzle piece of evidence comes to light, you can't throw out the whole rest of the puzzle. Most of this report is still classified, and the way the public part was written indicates policy suggestions rather than actual fact reporting (i.e. 'intelligence'). Bolton was the Undersecretary for Arms Control in 2003 and attests to the fact that there was little if any political pressure on Iran to stop their nuclear program at the time; if anything caused them to actually stop, it was our military involvement in Iraq. Also, Bolton points out that they are still ramping up the key factors in developing nuclear weapons (enriching uranium). This exchange is key:

BOLTON: To either get fuel to power reactors or to have nuclear weapons, you need enriched uranium. Different levels, but you need to enrich uranium. So every intelligence analyst would tell you, the long pole in the tent, in assessing how long it takes to get weapons, is enriching uranium...[t]hey're still doing it, building up an inventory.

COLMES: They're very clear. They halted their covert nuclear weapons program in 2003. It's very clear.

BOLTON: What part of the weapons program? The weaponization design. And this same judgment says we have only moderate confidence that that suspension is still in place.

Something stinks with this report, and I have a feeling it will prove to be very harmful in the long run. I hope I'm wrong.

There's my two cents.